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Chapter 1
Introduction
According to the IBM1 Rail liberalization Index Kirchner (2011), Aus-
tria has since April 2011 been part of the advanced group of liberalized
rail transport in Europe. The IBM monitoring reports that access to both
freight2 and train operating companies3 is well established. Competition in
the rail freight market is already established and competition in the commer-
cial passenger rail transport market has started in December 2011.
In contrast to other countries in the advanced liberalized group, the Republic
of Austria has a direct negotiated contract with the incumbent operatorÖBB
Personenverkehr to operate non-commercial passenger rail transport on
ﬁx deﬁned lines. But there is an opening clause, so that eventually these
public transport services can be tendered one dayKirchner (2011).
When the question whether to tender or not to tender has been decided,
the central question remaining is: `What to tender?' This thesis is analyses
the implications of diﬀerent object designs in a public rail transport tender.
As a result of the ongoing liberalization of the European transport markets,
the highly subsidized public transport services will be increasingly tendered
so that the company with the highest bid will win the tender, and will be
awarded the concession and will thus have to perform the service for a ﬁxed
1An American based IT-Services Company
2Freight Operating Company (FOC) is a company which oﬀers cargo rail services
3Train Operating Company (TOC) is a company which operates passenger rail services
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period of time. That means that the train operating company does not only
have the right to run the public transport services, but in fact the train
operating company has the duty to run the public transport services for a
ﬁxed amount of subsidies.
With the formal privatization and the internationalization process of national
public transport providers and the concentration process between private
public transport companies and former national public transport companies,
the market concentration is ever more increasing.4 In all auctions the same
international companies are bidding for licenses at an increasing frequency
rate. Therefore the main challenge of the orderers of the regional passenger
rail transport is to save a sustainable and contestable market environment.
The central idea of this thesis is to ﬁnd what object design is optimal to
auction while minimizing public spending on transport services and at the
same time sustaining a competitive and contestable market environment.
Thus the research questions are the following:
1. Which object design minimizes public spending?
2. Which object design makes a tender more contestable?
The idea is to combine modern microeconomic theory and applied economic
research. Therefore standard auction and game theory are used for predicting
an outcome of diﬀerent object designs.
In chapter two, the author provides the technical and economic market back-
ground which is useful to understand the current tender designs. In chapter
three you will ﬁnd the general characteristics of an oﬀer auction, in particular
the market organization, the obejct and the auction design. The assumptions
for the benchmark are outlined in chapter four. In chapter ﬁve the author
tries to give an answer to the ﬁrst research question by benchmarking the
4The concentration process has started in 2008 with the acquisition of Abellio by Ned-
erlandse Spoorwegen (NS), the acquisition of Keolis by the Société Nationale des Chemins
de fer français (SNCF) 2010, also 2010, the acquisition of Arriva by Deutsche Bahn (DB)
and Arriva Germany by Ferrovie dello Stato (FS).
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four diﬀerent auction object designs in a private value setting. In chapter
six focus lies on the second research question. Section seven comprises the
conclusion.
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Chapter 2
The Passenger Rail Transport
Industry
2.1 Four Levels of Rail Transport
Passenger transport is very similarly organized in many European countries.
There are four levels of transport. On the highest level are high speed
trains which often operate on a network of their own and connect Euro-
pean metropolitan areas.1 On the second level there are InterCity2 trains,
which connect large cities with metropolitan areas. These two types of trains
are the so called long-distance trains and are in this thesis referred to as ﬁrst-
tier and second-tier trains. On the third level there are fast-stopping-trains3.
They connect large cities or metropolitan areas with medium sized towns.
And ﬁnally on the lowest level, there are stopping-trains and rapid transit
systems. Stopping trains are trains 4 which connect large cities and medium-
sized towns with small towns and villages. Rapid transit systems5 are the
1In Austria: ÖBB Railjet
2Often known as EuroCity or Corail in France. In Austria: ÖBB-InterCity, ÖBB-
EuroCity and since December 2011 WESTbahn
3In Austria: RegionalExpress (REX)
4In Austria: Regionalzug (R)
5In Austria: S-Bahn (S)
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backbone of city and suburban transport in metropolitan areas. In the fol-
lowing, the fast-stopping-train and the stopping-train/rapid-transit-train will
be called third and fourth tier train. There is an overview about the four
levels in Table 2.1.1.
Table 2.1.1: Four Levels of Transport
(Source: authors' own illustration)
To the authors knowledge, all ﬁrst-tier trains in Europe are proﬁtable6 and
operated by publicly owned monopolists at their own business risks but more
and more by now being run by private companies7. For InterCity trains this
is diﬀerent. In Great Britain tender about subsidies is common, the so-called
Intercity-franchises, but there is the possibility of open access for commer-
cial InterCity lines8. The InterCity trains are subsidized without tender in
many European countries, for example, in Austria, France or the Nether-
lands. InterCity services without ﬁnancial support operate in Scandinavian
states or Germany. So the proﬁtability of InterCity lines is not secure. This
thesis is about subsidized rail transport and thus mainly about fast-stopping
trains and stopping trains. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 2.1.1. The higher the
transport level, the higher is proﬁtability, too.
6E.g. the ICE in Germany or the TGV in France
7E.g Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatori (NTV) in Italy
8E.g. First Hull Trains
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Figure 2.1.1: Four Levels of Transport
(Source: authors' own illustration)
Diﬀerent railcars are needed. It is clear that it is not possible to operate
high-speed services with stopping train rolling-stock and vice versa, it is not
possible to operate a rapid transit system with high speed trains. But it
is also not very useful to use fast-stopping trains to operate an InterCity
or a stopping train service. Every level needs its own rolling stock. So
every railcar is speciﬁed according to the level of the service it helps to
provide. Furthermore there is a speciﬁcation according to standards applied
in each country. But it is possible to change this speciﬁcation without high
expenditures.9 So there is a secondary market for railcars, which means that
the investment cost for railcars is not sunk.
9Especially in countries like Austria, Germany and Switzerland technical standards are
very similar. So there is a common market for railcars. For example, the Hamburg-Köln
Express GmbH will start long-distance operations in Germany with former ÖBB railcars.
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2.2 Vertical Separation of Passenger Rail Trans-
port Industry
First of all it is important to know that the regional and city public transport
services in Europe are highly subsidized services. The states decide to provide
a system of public transport facilities to their citizens. A frequent interval
timetable is very expensive and only proﬁtable at peak times. To ensure a
stable and frequent public transport service, the state has to subsidize the
public transport operator.
Secondly, it is important to know that in economic policy there exists a dif-
ference between providing and producing a public service. On the one hand,
a public authority can provide and produce a public service like collective
security. And on the other hand, a public authority can provide a public
service by ordering a public service for the citizens from a private company.
This is, for example the case in providing public motorways.
This means that if the state produces a service this implies that the state
also provides the service. But if the state does not produce a public service,
this does not imply that the state does not provide a public service. In order
to provide a certain service, the state does not actually need to produce it.
Now a European state has basically two possibilities to provide public rail
transport. One way is by means of an in-house solution where a state-owned
network operating company10 also oﬀers transportation services. The other
solution is that the state decides to provide the services by tender.
Furthermore in the model, gross and net contracts are discussed. As shown
in Figure 2.2.1, in the case of net contracts the tender only contains railway
operations on the network. So the railway network as the upstream industry
is provided by a public entity. Therefore the downstream part of the railway
transport industry consists of two diﬀerent value-added levels. One level is
the train-operating business of rolling stock. Here the objective function is a
10network operating company (NOC): company which is the asset manager of the rail
network
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cost function and the operator has to minimize the cost of train operating.
This sector is particularly aﬀected by maintenance work and operational
planning or more generally by production. The second level is the marketing
of the product. Here the objective function of the seller is a revenue function,
with the seller having to solve a maximization problem. Since this sector
is strongly determined by marketing, the main task in this is to maximize
revenues. In case of net contracts there is an integrated downstream industry,
where a train operating company is responsible for production and marketing
and therefore has to bear both cost and revenue risk.
Figure 2.2.1: Integrated Downstream Industry
(Source: authors' own illustration)
If there are no synergies between operating a rail network and selling tick-
ets, respectively between marketing and production, one can split the down-
stream industry into a midstream industry, which operates the services and
faces the cost risk, and a downstream industry which sells the tickets and
faces the income risk like in Figure 2.2.2. That means that the state pro-
vides and maintains the rail network, while at same time it also provides the
production and sales of the rail operations via tender in which is the case
with net contracts. But now there are two industries, one consisting of spe-
cialized production companies which face the cost risks and the other being
14
specialized marketing companies which face the income risk.
Figure 2.2.2: Separated Downstream Industry
(Source: authors' own illustration)
Provided that the railway network is regulated, there is no rational reason to
integrate these three parts of the industry into one company. Otherwise, if the
railway network is not regulated, the train operating company is in a classical
hold-up situation. This is due to the fact that the network operating company
can prevent access to the rail network or impose monopolistic track access
charges on the train operating company. The complexity of a wheel-rail-
system leads to high level speciﬁc requirements which increase the speciﬁcity
and as a result the uncertainty of the investments for both operators.
Thus there should be only one way without regulation to avoid this hold-
up situation. Both parts of the value chain have to be integrated into one
company. If most of the network investments are sunk the network operator
has to integrate the diﬀerent levels of the value chain by vertical forward
integration. This may be the reason why since the beginning of rail transport
there still been existing integrated train and network operating companies.
If the operation of the network is regulated and there exists a secure legal
framework the company boundaries of an integrated train and network op-
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erating company are no longer optimal. With price regulation, open access
and a regulated framework for system integration the speciﬁcity and uncer-
tainty of investments for both companies are low. Therefore it is possible
to have a vertically separated industry with companies concentrated on the
core business.
The same applies to the situation between the marketing company and the
train operating company. Basically, the speciﬁcity and the uncertainty of the
investments for the two companies together are very high. It is therefore rea-
sonable to assume that in an unregulated market a vertical integration of the
two companies would be useful to avoid a hold-up situation. Therefore from
the perspective of transaction cost theory, it was quite reasonable to have an
integrated state owned network, train and marketing operating company in
the market.
Due to the fact that the contractee stipulates the scope of services for the
train operating company, the speciﬁcity and uncertainty of the investments
for train operating and marketing companies are low.
In summary, from the perspective of transaction cost theory the vertical
integration of diﬀerent levels of the value chain is not necessary and a market
solution is possible.
Nevertheless it is necessary that the contracts between the contractee and
the contractors on the diﬀerent levels of value chain are complete for the hor-
izontal relations between contractor and contractee and the vertical relations
between the contractors.
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Chapter 3
General Auction Characteristics
3.1 Market Organization
The main diﬀerence between a rail transport tender as compared to a regular
auction are the unproﬁtable operations, so the train operating company does
not have to pay for the unproﬁtable concession. Instead, it gets a ﬁnancial
compensation for the services. Thus, the company requiring the lowest sub-
sidies, i.e. the company with the highest bid in the auction, will attract and
provide the advertised service for a ﬁxed period.
Every year especially the German federal states oﬀer a lot of such tenders. So
there are two levels of competition. The ﬁrst level is the local competition for
one regional monopolistic aftermarket. Every regional aftermarket is a sub-
network of the whole rail-network. So every outcome of an auction changes
the state of the national premarket. Or if a train operating company wins
an auction, the train operating company wins the regional aftermarket for
transportation services and maybe achieve a stronger position in the national
premarket. Therefore on the regional level there exists competition in the
consumer market, while on the national level there is competition for local
monopolistic aftermarkets for train operations.
With regard to the fact that local aftermarkets are embedded in a greater
network, there are eﬀects of adjacencies of other aftermarkets or some be-
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havioural strategic eﬀects. This thesis is focuses on the eﬀects of the form
of auctioning. The analysis is independent of the economic appeal insofar
as there is the general assumption that all aftermarkets have a payoﬀ below
zero and thus have to be subsidized.
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3.2 Object Design
A ﬁrst special issue within the topic of how to auction an aftermarket is the
diﬀerence between gross and net contracts. These are two diﬀerent designs
of the tendered objects. Reconsider that in the case of 'gross contracts' the
train operating company is only responsible for train operations. In the case
of 'net contracts' the train operating company is also responsible for the
selling and distribution of tickets. Therefore 'gross contracts' mean that the
train operating company faces the cost risk and the public contractee faces
the income risk. Otherwise in the case of 'net contracts' the transport service
provider faces both cost and income risks.
Secondly there is the diﬀerence between publicly and privately ﬁnanced
rolling-stock. In the ﬁrst case, the public contractee uses his advantage1
on the ﬁnancial markets and ﬁnances the rolling-stock less expensively than
the private operator. This may lead to diﬀerent expectations about rev-
enues. So the valuation would be more uncertain. Therefore it is interesting
to explore diﬀerences in valuation between auctions with net contracts and
auctions with gross contracts.
We assume that the contractee has the option to choose between four diﬀer-
ent object designs (gross contract with privately ﬁnanced rolling-stock, gross
contract with publicly ﬁnanced rolling stock, net contract with privately ﬁ-
nanced rolling-stock and net contract with publicly ﬁnanced rolling-stock),
thus between four diﬀerent scenarios with four diﬀerent auction results. Then
the train operating company decides to stay out or to stay in and bid some-
thing for the license. Furthermore, we assume that the payoﬀ is zero if one
train operating company loses the auction or decides for the outside option.
Hence in the case of 'stay out' or 'stay in' and losing the auction the train
operating company receives a proﬁt of 0 and the contractee has to pay the
train operating company nothing. In the case of 'staying in and accepting the
bid' the train operating company receives a payoﬀ x− b and the contractee
1A ﬁnancially stable European country like Austria has a very high solvency. The
reason for this is the ability to levy new taxes, if needed.
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has to pay B, with B being the public budget for this transport service and
x being the value of the object. B consists of b and ψ, with b representing
the bid describes above and ψ the missing parts of the contract. The missing
parts of the contract are described in Table 3.2.1:
ψ gross contract net contract
private rolling-stock marketing
public rolling-stock rolling stock, marketing rolling stock
Table 3.2.1: Object Design
(Source: authors' own illustration)
Deﬁnition 3.2.1. Given gross and net contracts and objects design with
publicly ﬁnanced rolling stock and private rolling stock. There are four dif-
ferent object designs respectively:
Gross contract with publicly ﬁnanced rolling stock. Denoted by gc
Gross contract with privately rolling stock. Denoted by gcr
Net contract with publicly ﬁnanced rolling stock. Denoted by nc
Net contract with privately ﬁnanced rolling stock. Denoted by ncr
For each of these object designs the composition of the public budget is
diﬀerent.
Deﬁnition 3.2.2. Given the object designs describes above, there are four
diﬀerent compositions of the public budget:
A budget for gross contract with publicly ﬁnanced rolling-stock Bgc consists
of subsidies for the train operating company bgc, revenues from ticket selling
w and capital cost of the rolling stock r.
Bgc = −bgc − ψgc = −bgc + w − r (3.2.1)
A budget for the gross contract with private rolling-stock Bgcr contains sub-
sidies bgcr and the revenues from ticket selling w.
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Bgcr = bgcr + ψgcr = −bgcr + w (3.2.2)
A budget for the net contract with publicly ﬁnanced rolling-stock Bnc in-
cludes subsidies bnc and the capital cost r of the rolling stock.
Bnc = bnc + ψnc = −bnc + r (3.2.3)
A budget for the net contract with private rolling-stock Bncr contains the
subsidies bncr.
Bncr = −bncr, andψncr = 0 (3.2.4)
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3.3 Auction Design
If the state has opted for the tender, then again the contractee has two op-
tions. The contractee can choose between a quality competition (Beauty
Contest) and a price competition. This thesis only examines what it means
when if the contractee decides for a competition about subsidies (price com-
petition). In the rail transport industry a beauty contest is called a functional
tender. To the author's knowledge there is no example of a pure functional
tender in the passenger rail transport industry. To the author's knowledge
there were only two instance of this kind of tender in public bus transport
in the small city of Elmshorn in the Hamburg Metropolitan Area and in
Haarlem in the Netherlands van de Velde et al. (2008).
The tender of a public rail transport concession is a non-cooperative game,
where the contractee decides which contract design he will oﬀer. Furthermore
the tender is a sealed-bid ﬁrst-price oﬀer auction. To the author's knowledge
there are no open oﬀer auctions or second-price auctions in public rail trans-
port. There is no case in literature where second price sealed bid auction is
used in such a tender.
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Chapter 4
Assumptions
The aim of the following subsection is to apply to the model the speciﬁc
characteristics of the public rail transport industry, which were described in
sections one and two. We do this by stating the assumptions, explaining
the aim of these assumptions and the plausibility of the assumptions in the
context of the rail transport industry.
4.1 The Value of the Object is Negative.
In reality all concessions in public transport are not proﬁtable for two reasons:
The ﬁrst reason is production-related and the second reason is of a political
nature.
4.1.1 Timetable and Peak Times
Firstly, we know from Subsection 2.2 that a timetable with short intervals is
very expensive and only proﬁtable at peak times; and that the state has to
subsidize public transport companies to ensure a stable timetable with high
reliability.
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4.1.2 Public Transport is a political good
Secondly, in Europe there exists a second reason for subsidized public trans-
port. In many European countries rail passengers have become accustomed
to low rail fares. These rail passengers are also voters which mean that
cost-covering rail fares are politically not feasible. Furthermore, in many Eu-
ropean countries the political top priority goes towards enhancing the modal
split in public transport by subsidized below-cost rail fares.
4.2 Train Operating Companies are Symmet-
ric.
This means that N diﬀerent potential train operating companies assign a
value Xi to the object which is the maximum of what train operating com-
pany i wants to pay for the object. If the N train operating companies are
symmetric, they draw their valuation and the corresponding private signal
from the same interval. That means that Xi is identical and independently
distributed over the interval [−∞, ω]. Train operating company i knows only
its own signal xi the realization of the random variable Xi. In that case train
operating company i will play a strategy βi : [−∞, ω]→ R−.
The aim of this assumption is to make the diﬀerent train operating companies
easily comparable. This assumption is plausible in so far as we know from
the introduction that there is an ongoing concentration process in the public
transport market. In the beginning of privatization, there was a national
incumbent operator almost everywhere and some small local entrepreneurs.
With ongoing privatization and concentration between former incumbent op-
erators and private operators, as well as between private operators diﬀerences
diminish between the potential contractors.
These symmetric train operating companies draw their valuation from an
interval which contains up to three diﬀerent parts of the industry described
above. For each part there exists an interval so that:
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ci ∈ [c, c] (4.2.1)
wi ∈ [w,w] (4.2.2)
ri ∈ [r, r] (4.2.3)
4.2.1 Cost of Train Operations
The cost of train operations consists of an important ﬁxed cost element and
some variable costs of operations dependent on the required amount of seat
kilometres and the required amount of train kilometres. From this it follows
that there is an important ﬁxed cost element, because the required amount
of seat kilometres and the required amount of train kilometres are ﬁxed in
the tender document. The train operating companies know before a tender
occurs how many seat and train kilometres they have to produce, if they win
the tender.
Thus they know the required amount of seat kilometers, but not the realized
amount of passenger kilometres. The required amount of train kilometres is
the traveled distance of one train
train kilometres (TKM) = traveled distance of one train (4.2.4)
and the required amount of seat kilometres is the multiplied number of the
train capacity and the train kilometres, which is ﬁxed in the tender docu-
ments.
seat kilometres (SKM) = train kilometres× train capacity (4.2.5)
The realized amount of passenger kilometres is the multiplied number of the
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passengers and their traveled distance. That means the contractors cannot
reduce their capacity if the demand is lower as expected.
passenger kilometres (PKM) = utilisation in percent× SKM (4.2.6)
If the train operating companies know how many train and seat kilometres
they have to produce, there is only uncertainty about their own ability to
produce the required amount of train kilometres and train operating company
i has the following optimization problem:
min ci(train kilometres) (4.2.7)
4.2.2 Revenues from train operations
The revenues from train operations consist of the realized amount of revenue
passenger kilometres which is calculated by the number of revenues paid by
the passengers for the travelled distances. Therefore there is uncertainty
about the ability to sell tickets and the realized amount of revenue passenger
kilometres. Thus there are not only risks about the company's own ability
to sell tickets, there are also risks about the expected demand.
revenue passenger kilometres (RPK) = PKM × price per traveled distance
(4.2.8)
Please note there is also a cost function which is a side condition of the
revenue function. We know the company which is responsible for marketing
has to maximize the revenues if it wants to minimize the cost of marketing
i.e. it has to solve the optimization problem is 4.9
maxwi(RPKM) s.t.min ci(amount of customers, ...) (4.2.9)
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4.2.3 Capital Cost
The uncertainty about the capital cost is exogenous. Therefore the interval
for the symmetric train operating companies is an interval dependent on
the intrest rate. The total volume of the capital cost depends on the train
capacity and the train kilometres and additionally required quality standards.
It is logical and necessary that the capital cost depends on the size of the
railcars and that the depreciation depends on the train kilometers. So far
the optimization problem of the train ﬁnance company is the following:
min ri(TKM,Capacity,Quality Standards) (4.2.10)
4.2.4 The Sum of Intervals
For each contract design there exists an interval of its own, which is a sum
of one, two or three of the intervals describes above. In the case of gross
contracts with publicly ﬁnanced rolling-stock the interval for the symmetric
train operating companies is the same as the interval resulting the risk of the
rail operations.
bgc = ci ∈ [c, c] (4.2.11)
Figure 4.2.1: Gross Contract with Publicly Provided Rolling-Stock
(Source: authors' own illustration)
The interval for the net contract with publicly ﬁnanced rolling-stock is the
sum of the rail operations interval and the revenue interval. Considering the
assumption that public transport is not proﬁtable, the net contract interval
is less than zero like in Figure 4.2.2.
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bnc ∈ [c+ w, c+ w] (4.2.12)
Figure 4.2.2: Net Contract with Publicly Provided Rolling-Stock
(Source: authors' own illustration)
With the same reasoning the interval of the gross contract with privately
ﬁnanced rolling-stock is the sum of the rail operations interval and the capital
cost interval and is thus also below zero as illustrated in Figure 4.3.
bgcr ∈ [c+ r, c+ r] (4.2.13)
Figure 4.2.3: Gross Contract with Privately Financed Rolling-Stock
(Source: authors' own illustration)
The net contract with privately ﬁnanced rolling-stock is the sum of all three
intervals and consequently the value of the object is below zero.
bncr ∈ [c+ w + r, c+ w + r] (4.2.14)
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Figure 4.2.4: Net Contract with Privately Financed Rolling-Stock
(Source: authors' own illustration)
4.3 Common Knowledge of Rationality.
The aim of this assumption is market eﬃciency. It is the most common
assumption in game theory and was introduced by Aumann in 1976 Aumann
(1976). This is a plausible assumption insofar as we assume that the train
operating companies are symmetric and from the same type, they are global
player and the concentration process is in advanced progress and time for
behavioural strategic bidding is over.
4.4 Bidding is costless.
This is a technical assumption. In general it is not plausible, that bidding in
public rail transport is costless. There are costs involved regarding the com-
pany's estimation of its own ability to produce rail operations or to prepa-
ration of correct oﬀer documents. If we model the cost of bidding as a sunk
entry fee which is very small relative to the volume of the concession and
there are N symmetric train operating companies with symmetric arbitrarily
small sunk entry fees which are negligible, that does not aﬀect the outcome
of the tender.
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4.5 Train Operating Companies are Risk-Neutral.
The goal of this assumption is to use risk neutral-models, because in that
case the eﬀect of risk aversion does not matter. This assumption is for con-
venience, as the train operating companies are specialized in rail operations.
Perhaps some bidders with aggressive growth were risk-neutral in the be-
ginning of rail privatisation so that they suﬀer of winner's curse during the
contract period.
Furthermore, there are some examples of winner's curse in the rail transport
industry, for example the Flensburg ExpressLalive und Schmutzler (2008)
in Germany, BK Tåg in Sweden and Connex 2003 in the United Kingdom
Alexandersson (2009). For an overview of winner's curse in the rail trans-
port industry see Lalive and Schmutzler (2008) Lalive und Schmutzler (2008),
Beck (2006)and Andersson (2009) Alexandersson (2009). Whether winner's
curse has a critical impact on public rail transport tendering has not ex-
actly empirically proven. But there still exists some examples of winner's
curse such that one can assume that train operating companies in public rail
transport tenders are risk neutral.
4.6 Train Operating Companies Only Consider
the Number of Potential Train Operating
Companies and Not the Number of Actively
Bidding Train Operating Companies.
The goal of this assumption is to explain why train operating companies con-
sider a strategic eﬀect for participating train operating companies if they bid
in a sealed-bid tender. The assumption is highly plausible, because Amaral et
al. (2009)Amaral et al. (2009) have shown for the public bus transport mar-
ket of London that the individual bus operating companies bid according
to the number of potential bus operating companies and not to the num-
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ber of actively participating bus operating companies. Thus train operating
companies know the number of potential train operating companies in the
beginning of the tender.
4.7 There are No Synergies between Produc-
tion and Marketing, because Operational
Requirements are Well Deﬁned in the Con-
tract.
The aim of this assumption is to explain why it is possible to divide the
downstream part of the public transport industry into a midstream part and
a downstream part as already described in section two. This assumption
has a strong connection to the assumption about the valuation intervals.
The required amount of seat kilometres is ﬁxed in the contract, thus for the
rail operations the realized amount of revenue passenger kilometres does not
matter. We already know that the rail operator cannot ﬁt his supply to the
demand. This implies that there are no advantages of an integrated short-
term capacity and yield management like in long-distance rail transport or
air transport. Thus there is no necessary connection between rail operations
and marketing and both parts can stand alone.
Furthermore we know from section two that there are no synergies between
marketing and production. Hence, it is possible to operate both parts of
the industry separately with the same eﬃciency as if they were operated
integratedly.
The same is true for rolling-stock. The ﬁnancing of rolling stock-has no
inﬂuence on the maintenance or the selling of tickets. If the public entity
ﬁnances the rolling-stock this does not mean that it also chooses the rolling-
stock. In the case of gross contracts, the rail operator chooses rolling stock
and the public entity ﬁnances the rolling stock.
There are many examples from Germany where a new entrant operates rail
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transport and the former incumbent operator DB Regio AG performs the
marketing of the rail operations.1 For example in public bus transport gross
contracts are the rule Amaral et al. (2009).
There is already an example from the German Ruhr Area, where the winning
train operating company decides which railcars they will use for the train op-
erations, while the public entity Verkehrsverbund Rhein-Ruhr (VRR)
ﬁnances the railcars.Jasper (2009)
4.8 There Exist a Reservation Price
We know from empirical economic research that private rail operators im-
prove the quality of rail operations and reduce the cost Yvrande-Billon (2006),Ama-
ral et al. (2009). The public ineﬃciencies are the so-called Leibenstein-X-
ineﬃciencies.Leibenstein (1966) Thus, there is a reservation price for the
contractee. If the bid of all train operating companies is lower than the X-
ineﬃciencies, then the contractee will not tender. Because of that there is
only one reason that the contractee tender: He hopes that there is an op-
erator who is more eﬃcient in producing public services. In the following b
denotes the reservation price of the contractee. Suppose all train operating
companies know b.
4.9 There Exist Horizontal Synergies in the Case
of Ticket Selling
The purpose of this assumption is to clarify why a direct award or tender
of ticket sales can be cheaper for the contractee. Although synergies do
no exist between rail operations and marketing, there can exist synergies
between the diﬀerent levels of public transport. In many European countries
there exist transport networks with integrated fares for bus and train. These
1e.g. Arriva-Länderbahn Express
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fares include transportation by bus and the two lowest levels of rail transport.
Moreover, in most European countries there exists one sales system for all
four levels of transport.
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4.10 Number of Potential Train Operating Com-
panies
In the following analysis we can distinguish four diﬀerent scenarios. Each of
these scenarios or contracts requires diﬀerent skills from the train operating
companies. Therefore the number of potential train operating companies
depends on the necessary skills. Given the value-added segments described
above, we know that from the perspective of a train operating company
the net contract is an extension of the gross contract and a contract with
privately ﬁnanced rolling-stock is an extension of a contract with publicly
ﬁnanced rolling-stock.
Basically, train operating companies must be able to handle rail transport.
Without this basic ability, a company cannot participate in a public rail
transport tender. All other types of contracts such as the gross contract
with publicly ﬁnanced rolling-stock are extensions of this basic capability.
Winning train operating companies have to be suﬃciently capitalized to ﬁ-
nance their own rolling stock.
In the case of net contracts with publicly ﬁnanced rolling-stock the potential
train operating companies have to be able to operate rail services and to sell
tickets. These companies must have expertise in marketing and production.
Thus the last two scenarios are extensions of the simple gross contract sce-
nario with publicly ﬁnanced rolling-stock. That means that if a company can
bid for one of the two contracts, this company can also bid for the simple
gross contract.
In the last case in which a potential train operating company controls pro-
duction and marketing and furthermore is suﬃciently capitalized, it can bid
for all types of contracts.
We know that there are two core competencies, train operation and marketing
and one property, namely excellent credit rating, to ﬁnancing the railcars.
Suppose all companies which are able to operate trains are in set Sc, all
companies which are able to sell tickets are in the set Sw and all companies
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with an excellent credit rating are in set Sr. Then follow from subsection 3.2
that Ngc are the counted elements (companies) of set Sc. Nnc are the counted
elements of intersection Sc ∩ Sw, and equivalently, Ngcr are the elements of
intersection Sc ∩ Sr; and the number of the potential bidders which are able
to fulﬁll a net contract with privately ﬁnanced railcars are the elements of
the intersection Sc ∩ Sw ∩ Sr . So far, if we have no information about
the distribution of the eﬃcient train operating companies among the three
diﬀerent sets, we have to assume that every intersection acts like a ﬁlter and
the following statements are true:
(Sc ∩ Sw ∩ Sr) ⊆ (Sc ∩ Sw) ⊆ Sc (4.10.1)
(Sc ∩ Sw ∩ Sr) ⊆ (Sc ∩ Sr) ⊆ Sc (4.10.2)
Figure 4.10.1: Filter 1
(Source: authors' own illustration)
Statement 4.10.1 is illustrated in Figure 4.10.1 and statement 4.10.2 is il-
lustrated in Figure 4.10.2. With every extension of the gross contract with
publicly ﬁnanced rolling-stock the number of potential bidders is diminishing.
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Figure 4.10.2: Filter 2
(Source: authors' own illustration)
Consequently the number of potential train operating companies will be
higher if the contractee oﬀers contracts where fewer qualiﬁcations are re-
quired. Suppose N is the number of potential tender participants or the
counted elements in each set or intersection of sets, then the following state-
ments are true
Ngc ≥ Nnc ≥ Nncr (4.10.3)
Ngc ≥ Ngcr ≥ Nncr (4.10.4)
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Chapter 5
Theoretical Benchmark
In this section an answer to the ﬁrst research question is given. The goal of
this section is to determine which object design is optimal for the contractee.
For the benchmark the market structure of the aftermarket has no inﬂuence
on the auction. The idea of this contract design is to show which contract
design minimizes public spending in a market with symmetric train operating
companies.
5.1 The Contractee Prefers Public Financed Rolling-
Stock
According to Kirchner (2011), especially in the advanced liberalized countries
of Western Europe 1, the privatization of public rail transport has progressed.
We know that in these countries, public bodies generally have a much higher
creditworthiness than private companies. Taking this circumstance into ac-
count, we assume that the public sector has massive ﬁnancial beneﬁts.
This means that a private company would have to face much higher interests,
if it wanted to ﬁnance the rolling-stock than the public sector. Therefore it
1Sweden, Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, Netherlands and Austria.
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is reasonable that the contractee will always opt for contracts with publicly
ﬁnanced rolling stock.
Furthermore, we know from subsection 4.2.3 that capital costs depends on the
size and the quality standards of the railcar and the depreciation depends on
the required amount of train kilometers. While the interest rate is exogenous,
the capital cost depends on determinants which are under the control of the
contractee.
But that does not mean that the winning bidder has to run the services
with publicly chosen railcars. Such models exist with publicly owned railcar
companies. But there exist also more eﬃcient models. So there is a model
in the Rhein-Ruhr Metropolitan area where each party takes over the tasks
they can perform best and most economically.Jasper (2009)
While the contractee buys and ﬁnances the railcars, the train operating com-
pany chooses and orders the railcars after winning the contract. During the
contract period, the train operating company has to ensure the maintenance.
As the train operating company uses the railcars, it can quickly identify faults
and also has to control and ensure the preservation of the quality of the rail-
cars.
The proposed funding leads to cost reductions for the public contractee. It
also means that each party takes over the tasks they can perform best and
most economically.Jasper (2009)
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5.2 Setup
We can consider that every player wants to maximize
pii =
xi − bi if0 if bi > max−ib−ibi < max−ib−i (5.2.1)
where xi is diﬀerent for the four diﬀerent contracts so that pii is diﬀerent for
the four diﬀerent scenarios. Player i receives xi − bi if his bid is the highest
bid of N − 1 bids (e.g. bi > max−ib−i), otherwise he receives 0.
The tender of the subsidized services is a ﬁrst-price auction in the southwest
quadrant of the bid-valuation diagram like in Figure 5.2.1. Suppose β is the
increasing and diﬀerentiable symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy2 and ω
is the signal of the value. So the equilibrium for a sealed bid ﬁrst-price oﬀer
auction is with small diﬀerences exactly the same as in a classical ﬁrst price
auction. The sole diﬀerence is the role of 0 as a bid. In a classical sealed-bid
ﬁrst-price auction 0 is the same like stay out, while in a sealed bid ﬁrst-price
oﬀer auction 0 is a bid, which is very attractive for the contractee.
2The linear function is chosen for simplicity. Of course others are also possible.
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Figure 5.2.1: Bidding Function
(Source: authors' own illustration)
Furthermore 0 is important in order to calculate the equilibrium in a classical
sealed-bid ﬁrst-price auction. This is not possible in an oﬀer auction. There-
fore it is useful to introduce a reservation price b. Suppose that the contractee
will never accept a bid below b, then b can accomplish the same technical
function as 0 in a classical ﬁrst-price auction. The following formulation of
the equilibrium in a ﬁrst-price auction is very close to the formulation and
notation of a ﬁrst-price auction equilibrium in Krishna (2010).
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5.3 Sealed-Bid First-Price Private-Value Oﬀer
Auction
In a sealed-bid ﬁrst price private-value oﬀer auction every train operating
company has a private valuation. Thus there is no interdependence between
two train operating companies' valuations and the signals which the train
operating companies receive are not aﬃliated. Thus every train operating
company has a subjective, independent and exogenously determined value of
its own and has no information about private value of other train operating
companies.
5.3.1 The Equilibrium Strategy of the Winning Opera-
tor
Suppose ωi is the independent and exogenous valuation of player i and pii are
the proﬁts which player i can receive if he wins the auction. If bi = ωi then
pii = 0, because player i is indiﬀerent with regard to oﬀering or not oﬀering
he will never bid more than ωi.
3 This means that bidding lower calculations
of subsidies than are required to operate the rail services with zero proﬁts,
is not a proﬁtable strategy.
To derive this equilibrium, suppose that independently of the object design
N ≥ 2 train operating companies follow a symmetric and diﬀerentiable equi-
librium strategy β∗ ≡ β. Furthermore train operating company i receives a
non aﬃliated signal about operations xi. This signal is an estimate of the
cost of the operations and therefore a realization of a random variable Xi.
After it has received the signal, it can calculate its optimal bid bi and bids
bi. Krishna (2010)
In the next step one wants to calculate the optimal strategy of player 1 which
is called β. Suppose all train operating companies j 6= i follow a symmetric
3Please note that the valuation for the train operating company has a diﬀerent sign
than the classical ﬁrst-price auction, which means if the valuation increases in absolute
numbers, player i needs more subsidies to operate the services.
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and diﬀerentiable equilibrium bidding strategy. Train operating company i
wins the tender, whenever train operating company i submit the highest bid4,
that is when the maximum bid of all the other train operating companies is
lower than the bid of train operating company i (maxjβ(Xi) < b) and since
β(b) = b, where b is the reservation price Krishna (2010):
β∗(x) =
1
G(x)
xˆ
b
yg(y)dy = E[Y1 | Y1 < x] (5.3.1)
Where x−β∗(x) is the mark-up on the oﬀer, suppose x−β∗(x) = αx , then α is
the mark-up coeﬃcient. Every mark-up coeﬃcient smaller than one increases
the amount of subsidies and makes the operating activities proﬁtable. It is
the target of the train operating company to increase the mark-up to gain
more proﬁts. On the other hand the contractee wants to decrease the mark-
up to minimize public spending. The train operating company can increases
the proﬁts if the number of potential train operating companies is small and
therefore the probability to win the tender is high. If the probability to win
the tender is small, then the train operating company has to decrease the
mark-up to win the tender.
5.3.1.1 The mark-up depends on N
Vickrey (1961) has shown, that it is possible to rewrite the equilibrium bid-
ding strategy as
β∗(x) = x−
xˆ
b
G(y)
G(x)
dy (5.3.2)
Where G(y)
G(x)
=
[
F (y)
F (x)
]N−1
is the degree of shading. That means if the number
of competitive train operating companies increases, the chances of winning
4lowest oﬀer
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the auction are diminished, the mark-up coeﬃcient converges to one and the
ﬁrst-price auction mark-up decreases to zero.
In a classical ﬁrst-price auction the degree of shading ensures that the equi-
librium winning bid is below the valuation. The diﬀerence between bid and
valuation is the proﬁt of the winning train operating company. A greater
degree of shading leads to lower bids and higher proﬁts. The optimal degree
of shading depends on the number of potential Train Operating Companies.
As the number of potential train operating companies increases, the prof-
its of the winning train operating company converge to zero. In summary,
with a decreasing number of potential train operating companies the proﬁts
increase of the train operating company with the highest bid.
In the case of tenders this means that the degree of shading is a mark-up
on the oﬀer. This mark-up increases when the number of train operating
companies is decreasing and it goes to zero as the number of train operating
companies is increasing.
We know from section three that the number of potential train operating
companies depends on the chosen object design. That means that the mark-
up in the case of gross contracts is relatively larger than in the case of net
contracts. With the same reasoning the mark-up is larger in the case of
publicly ﬁnanced rolling stock than in the case of privately funded rolling
stock.
5.3.2 The Contractee's Decision.
Suppose that the risk-neutral train operating companies follow the equilib-
rium bidding strategy β∗(x) derived above independently of the object design.
Then the contractee has to decide which object design to choose in order to
maximize the bids. In other words, the contractee wants to minimize the
mark-up coeﬃcient. Therefore the contractee has to ﬁnd the smallest bud-
get, which allows him to operate the public service.
Consider again the diﬀerence between privately and publicly ﬁnanced rolling
stock. Even under the assumption that private operators have the same
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ﬁnance standing as the public sector, it may not be eﬀective for the contractee
to ﬁnance the rolling-stock privately, because if the contractee commissions a
private ﬁnancier, this private ﬁnancier would still ask for a mark-up to make
proﬁts.
5.3.2.1 The decision between gross and net contracts
Therefore we consider only the choice between gross and net contracts with
publicly ﬁnanced rolling-stock. Now there are two diﬀerent object designs
and one has to deﬁne two diﬀerent signals xi. Both signals are estimates of
the real operational cost and revenues.
We know both contracts consist maximally of two diﬀerent independent parts
(production, marketing). Because there are no synergies between the two
parts, it is possible to formulate the signal for one contract as the sum of the
signals for each part of the contract. The signal is a valuation drawn from
the sum of intervals as described above. Now the contractee has to select the
method according to which he has the fewest expenses. In the following we
have to compare the budgets for gross and net contracts.
First of all we have to formulate the payoﬀ functions and the expected payoﬀ
functions for both scenarios. Therefore we have to deﬁne in Deﬁnition 5.1
the diﬀerent signals.
Deﬁnition 5.3.1. Given well-formulated tender documents and that the
assumptions described in section three hold, then the estimate of the private
and independent cost of the whole operation for all players i = 1, .., N is
deﬁned as xi(ci) and the private and independent estimate of the private and
independent revenues from ticket selling for all players i = 1, ..., N is deﬁned
as xi(wi).
We know:
xi(ci) ∈ [c, c] (5.3.3)
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xi(ci) + xi(wi) ∈ [c+ w, c+ w] (5.3.4)
The cost and the revenues are not certain, because nobody knows the realized
amount of passenger kilometres at the beginning of the tender. And we
have to assume that there is uncertainty with regard to the ﬁrms knowledge
concerning production and marketing respectively. The capital costs are
uncertain, too. Therefore the needed subsidies required for the contracts
and the payments for the sales contracts are residual quantities.
By assumption the proﬁt functions of each object design are additive func-
tions. No synergies between marketing and production and respectively,
between selling and operations are realizable. That means the combination
of two or three parts of the industry in one contract and in this way in one
ﬁrm does not have any eﬀect on for the cost structure of marketing and
production.
Deﬁnition 5.3.2. Given the above formulated assumptions there are two
diﬀerent payoﬀ functions for the two diﬀerent object designs with publicly
ﬁnanced capital.
pii gross contract net contract
public capital β∗ − ci wi + β∗ − ci
Table 5.3.1: Payoﬀ Functions
(Source: authors' own illustration)
where
ci is the independent value of the operational cost,
wi is the independent value of the revenues
β∗ is the equilibrium bidding strategy
Before the auction occurs, the corresponding valuations are unknown and
can only be estimated from the interval described in section three. Thus
every contract is a random variable and accordingly has an expected value
and variance.
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Deﬁnition 5.3.3. Given the two diﬀerent signals xi from Deﬁnition 5.1.,
then we can deﬁne the two contract designs as follows:
Xi gross contract net contract
public rolling-stock xi(ci) xi(ci) + xi(wi)
Table 5.3.2: Signals
(Source: authors' own illustration)
1. xi(ci) is the private and independent estimate of the gross contract with
publicly ﬁnanced rolling-stock for all players i
2. xi(ci) + xi(wi) is the private and independent estimate of the net con-
tract with publicly ﬁnanced-rolling stock for all players i
There is an expected value µ for every estimator of the subsidies needed. In
the assumption which does not take into account synergies, these estimators
are additive and therefore the expected value of the operations is the sum of
the components. This leads to the following results:
gross contract net contract
public rolling-stock µc µc + µw
Table 5.3.3: Estimator
(Source: authors' own illustration)
Where are µc, µw are the expected values of the uncertain cost, revenues and
capital cost.
where
E[xi(ci)] = µc < 0 (5.3.5)
E[xi(ci,wi)] = E[xi(ci)] + E[xi(wi)] = µc + µw < 0 (5.3.6)
0 > µc + µw > µc (5.3.7)
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In the case of net contracts a third party has to sell the tickets and is re-
sponsible for the marketing part in the industry. In reality this is often the
incumbent operator or sometimes the contractee himself.
Assuming that the in-house solution for marketing in the case of gross con-
tracts can be made with the same eﬃciency as in the case of net contracts, it
is easy to show that the contractee would prefer the gross contract. We know
in the case of the net contract, that the number of potential train operating
companies would be smaller and thus the possible mark-up on railway oper-
ations and marketing would be higher. Thus, it is clear that if the in-house
solution could work with the same or a higher eﬃciency than the outsourcing
solution, the in-house solution is more favourable to the contracting author-
ity.
But what happens if the in-house solution produces less eﬃciency than the
outsourced solution? Then two eﬀects collide.
Firstly there is a lack of eﬃciency, respectively the in-house producer is too
expensive. If this is the case depends on third-party ticket sellers and is
exogenous in this model.
But there is also an a contrary mark-up of the winning train operating com-
pany. The mark-up of the winning train operating company is a mark-up
on the cost of rail operations and lower payments for the ticket revenues.
This means that the mark-up on the train operating cost is higher, because
there are fewer potential contractors available. Accordingly, the mark-up in
net contracts contains three parts. If the number of potential train operating
companies is smaller in the case of net contracts, then the mark-up coeﬃcient
is smaller as the mark-up coeﬃcient in the case of gross contracts. Therefore
the mark-up on the train operating cost consists of the same mark-up as in
the case of gross contracts and the diﬀerence net and gross contracts. That
means the extension of the contract (net contract) increases the mark-up on
operating cost. Furthermore there is the mark-up on the revenue payments.
In summary the third-party seller in the case of gross contracts has to be more
less eﬃcient as the winning Train Operating Company is more expensive in
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the case of net contracts, if the contractee should prefer net contracts.
5.3.3 Intermediate Results
The benchmark analysis in the private value setting delivers two key results.
Both results are based on the potential competition, which is determined by
the scope of the contract.
Firstly, a contractee will never prefer an agreement with privately funded
rolling-stock. Rather, he will decide on the basis of the expected increased
competition for contracts with public rolling-stock.
Secondly, the proﬁtability of the net contract is limited for two reasons: The
proﬁtability is limited by the potential synergies between diﬀerent levels of
transport and by the eﬀects of a contract extension (net contract). Through
the extension of the contract the potential competition also decreases. The
current ticket selling company has to be considerably less eﬃcient than the
train operating company for a net contract so that the contractee prefers the
net contract.
This is especially important, because there is not only the additional mark-
up on earnings, there is also an additional mark-up on the operational cost.
Since operating costs are much higher than the expected revenue this mark-
up is not negligible.
In a sealed-bid ﬁrst price private-value oﬀer auction every train operating
company has a private valuation. Thus there is no interdependence between
two train operating companies' valuations and the signals which the train
operating companies receive are not aﬃliated. Thus every Train Operating
Companies has an own subjective, independent and exogenously determined
value and has no information about other Train Operating Companies private
value.
There are many examples from Germany where a new entrant operates the
rail transport and the former incumbent operator DB Regio AG has to per-
form the marketing of the rail operations. Reconsider that it is plausible
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that the in-house or the tender solution for marketing in the case of gross
contracts can be made with the same eﬃciency is plausible. In this case it
is easy to show that the contractee would prefer a gross contract instead of
a net contract. For the net contract, we know that the number of potential
train operating companies would be smaller and thus the possible mark-up
on railway operations and marketing would be higher. Thus, it is clear that
if the in-house or the tender solution could be realized with the same or a
higher eﬃciency than the outsourcing solution, it is more favourable for the
contracting authority to choose the gross contract.
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Chapter 6
Contestability
We already know, that the object design minimizing public spending is the
gross contract with publicly ﬁnanced rolling-stock. To provide an answer to
the second research question we have to analyze the impact of the object
design on the contestability of the bidder market. Baumol (1982) introduced
the idea of contestable markets. The contestability of markets is described
by three main features:
1. No entry/exit barriers
2. No sunk cost
3. Access to the same level of technology/human capital
As already mentioned in section two, there are no obvious entry or exit
barriers. Indeed there are some hidden entry barriers dependent on the
object design. It is trivial to see that in a case of asymmetric bidders a
net contract with privately ﬁnanced railcars and a state-owned incumbent
operator has a signiﬁcant advantage. We know from section ﬁve, that in
the case of symmetric train operating companies the given auction design is
eﬃcient and that the gross contract with publicly ﬁnanced rolling stock is
the object design with the highest number of potential bidders.
From section two we know also, that the investment cost of the train oper-
ating companies is not sunk and access to the same level of technology is
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not prevented for the whole industry. Consequently, access to the same level
of technology is independent of the object design so that the contestability
of the market only depends on the possible entry barriers through pooled
concessions.
In reality perfect contestable markets do not exists. There is always a pos-
sibility to prevent access. One possibility to prevent access is to extend the
contracts with further value-added steps. We already know from section two
that there are two relevant markets, one for train operations and one for
marketing. Therefore a pooling of both relevant markets into one concession
ceils an artiﬁcial entry barrier into the market. This entry barrier reduces the
number of potential bidders. Therefore the degree of competition is reduced
due to the decreasing number of potential bidders so that the mark-up on
the oﬀers increases.
It is possible to show that in a private value setting the bidder with the
highest valuation of the tendered object wins the tender. Because the private-
value ﬁrst-price auction has symmetric and increasing equilibria, the bidder
with the highest signal among all the bidders is the winning bidder so that
the most eﬃcient bidder wins the tender independent of the auction design.
If we have symmetric bidders in each market, we have to analyze the eﬃciency
of the diﬀerent object designs. From subsection 5.1 we know that the auction
design is independent of the object design eﬃcient, because the players with
the highest signals are the bidders with the highest valuation of the object.
So far we can argue that the players which win a tender with gross contracts
are the most eﬃcient companies to operate trains. Analogously we can argue
that companies which win a tender with net contracts are the most eﬃcient
companies in train operating and marketing.
6.1 Train Operations
We know from subsection 4.10 that the extension of the pure train operating
contract works like a ﬁlter and reduces the number of potential bidders. That
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means we have no information about the distribution of the competencies
among the potential bidders. Furthermore we have to take into account
the probability decreases that the most eﬃcient bidder in other words the
company with the highest value participates and wins the tender, if the
volume of the contracts increases.
6.2 Financing railcars
According to the ﬁndings in subsection 5.1, it is reasonable that the con-
tractee will always opt for contracts with publicly ﬁnanced rolling-stock.
because a public body in Western Europe has a better credit rating than
a private company. As a consequence, public bodies are the most eﬃcient
railcar ﬁnanciers. It is not possible to ﬁnd a company with a better credit
rating than a public authority.
Let µ∗w be the expected value of the best credit rated entity. In that case,
the contractee has this rating and gets this most eﬃcient value.
6.3 Marketing
Reconsidering subsection 3.3, there are no vertical synergies between train
operations and marketing. Furthermore we know from subsection 3.4 that
the number of companies which can participate in a tender with net contracts
are smaller than or equal to the number of companies which can sell tickets.
Like in the previous case of train operations the intersection of the two sets
works like a ﬁlter. This ﬁlter reduces the number of potential bidders. With
the same reasoning as before the following statement is true
(Sc ∩ Sw ∩ Sr) ⊆ (Sc ∩ Sw) ⊆ Sw (6.3.1)
As a consequence it is more likely that the most eﬃcient player will be com-
missioned to be responsible for marketing, if the contractee does not tender
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train operations and marketing in an integrated manner.
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Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusion
The starting point of this master thesis was the ongoing concentration process
in the bidder market for public rail transport. In this context, it was the
goal to ﬁnd a theoretically optimal object design, which minimizes public
spending and sustains a competitive bidder market in the rail passenger
transport industry.
The rail passenger transport industry includes three value-added steps. We
have seen that a separation of the diﬀerent value-added steps is possible,
because the rail network is regulated and the local transport services are
tendered by complete contracts.
The nucleus of each tender is the value-added step production (the object
design being a gross contract with publicly ﬁnanced rolling-stock). An ex-
tension of this contract means the integration of two value-added steps or
the value-added step production and the ability to ﬁnance railcars. We have
shown that any extension of this core contract design reduces the number of
potential bidders.
As a ﬁrst-price auction is common in Europe, the oﬀered price depends on
the number of bidders. With an increasing number of bidders the likelihood
decreases that a bidder is the bidder with the highest valuation. In order
to win, the bidder has to bid a higher price with a lower mark-up on his
valuation.
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The probability that one's valuation is the highest valuation of the concession
increases when the number of potential bidders decreases. Therefore, the
integrated value chain of multiple value-added steps leads to higher prices in
the bidder market.
If the contractee has an excellent credit rating, the contractee should ﬁnance
the rolling stock. Otherwise the contractee will indirectly carry the risk
premium of the train operating company.
Given the assumptions made, there is a theoretically very clear answer to
the ﬁrst research question. The boundaries of the optimal object design are
the same as the boundaries of the value-added step production and both
parties take over the tasks they can perform best and most economically.
Thus the value-added step production should be tendered as a gross contract
with publicly ﬁnanced rolling stock.
The second research question can also be answered unequivocally. Because
of the proven eﬃciency of the auction design theory, the contestability of
the market is independent of the auction design. By extending the conces-
sion to provide additional value-added steps, the number of potential bidders
decreases. There is no guarantee that the most eﬃcient bidder for one value-
added step has all qualiﬁcations which are required to run the concession.
That is why only a gross contract with publicly ﬁnanced rolling-stock guar-
antees that the most eﬃcient train operating company wins the auction.
The integration of more than one value-added step into one contract reduces
the number of potential train operating company on a group of vertically
integrated Train Operating Companies. Thus the market for train opera-
tions is not contestable for train operating companies without the required
experience to run all value-added steps.
From the results of the theoretical benchmark it can be concluded that the
transport authorities will only get a sustainable and competitive bidder mar-
ket with economically satisfactory results, when they separate the value chain
into separated bidder markets for production and marketing.
The use of the public sector's funding advantage should be self-evident. The
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contractee has to choose an object design where both parties are able to take
over the tasks they can perform best and most economically.
The contractees have to act contrary to the increasing concentration processes
in the passenger rail transport industry. They have to win new bidders
from related industries like freight operating companies or leisure and travel
companies. They will only succeed in doing so, if they individually tender the
separated value-added steps. A freight operating company may serve a gross
contract well, but has no experience in marketing and, vice versa, a leisure
and travel company has the necessary experience for sales and marketing,
but certainly has no experience in the operation of railcars.
The still form of integrated concessions with marketing and production is
essentially a relic of the former state monopolies. We have seen that the
mutual dependencies do not exist anymore. If the contractees want to achieve
satisfactory results and prices, they have to develop methods and designs to
gain new potential bidders in suﬃcient numbers. Therefore the transport
authorities have to adopt the structures of the vertically integrated industry
and they have to break new ground.
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Abstract
The starting point of this master thesis is the ongoing concentration process
in the bidder market for public rail transport. Today, the main challenge of
the orderers of the regional passenger rail transport is to save a sustainable
and contestable market environment. This thesis is the ﬁrst attempt to
provide a theoretical prediction and a theoretical benchmark for the diﬀerent
object designs in a public rail transport tender.
The central idea of this thesis is to ﬁnd what object design is optimal to auc-
tion while minimizing public spending on transport services and at the same
time sustaining a competitive and contestable market environment. Thus
the research questions are: Which object design minimizes public spending?
And which object design makes a tender more contestable?
The idea is to combine modern microeconomic theory and applied economic
research. Therefore standard auction and game theory are used for predicting
and benchmarking an outcome of the diﬀerent object designs. From the
results of the theoretical benchmark it can be concluded that the transport
authorities will only get a sustainable and competitive bidder market with
economically satisfactory results, when they separate the value chain into
separated bidder markets for production and marketing.
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Zusammenfassung
Der Ausgangspunkt dieser Magisterarbeit ist der anhaltende Konzentrationsprozess
im Bietermarkt für den öﬀentlichen Schienenpersonennahverkehr. Die größte
Herausforderung für die Besteller ist heute die Sicherung eines nachhaltigen
und bestreitbaren Bietermarkts für den Schienenpersonennahverkehr. Diese
Arbeit ist der erste Versuch, eine theoretische Vorhersage und ein Bench-
mark für die verschiedenen Objekttypen Designs bieten in einer öﬀentlichen
Schienenverkehr ausgeschrieben.
Die zentrale Idee dieser Arbeit ist es, das optimale Objekt-Design zu ﬁnden
welches bei gleichzeitiger Minimierung der öﬀentlichen Ausgaben für Verkehrs-
dienstleistungen ein wettbewerbsfähiges und bestreitbares Marktumfeld sicher.
So sind die Fragestellungen: Welches Objekt-Design minimiert die öﬀentlichen
Ausgaben? Und welches Objekt Design macht eine Ausschreibung bestreit-
barer?
Die Idee ist es, moderne mikroökonomische Theorie und angewandteWirtschafts-
forschung zu kombinieren. Deshalb wird die Auktionstheorie und Spielthe-
orie für die Vorhersage und das Benchmarking der Ergebnisse der unter-
schiedlichen Objekt-Designs verwendet. Aus den Ergebnissen der theoretis-
chen Benchmarks kann der Schluss gezogen werde, dass die Verkehrsbehör-
den nur dann einen nachhaltigen und wettbewerbsfähigen Bietermarkt mit
wirtschaftlich befriedigende Ergebnisse erhalten, wenn sie die Wertschöp-
fungskette in getrennte Bietermärkte für Produktion und Vermarktung teilen.
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